The Biden administration’s latest victory lap over the collapse of Syria’s Assad regime is like a poorly written TV plot twist—implausible, unearned, and loaded with questions. It’s less like a strategic triumph and more like an opportunistic attempt to rewrite a narrative of weakness and missteps in the Middle East.
As Bashar Assad’s regime unravels, the White House is already breaking its arm, patting itself on the back. But let’s pump the brakes here. Did the administration’s actions really bring about this so-called victory? Or is it a case of swooping in to claim credit for the groundwork laid by others—mainly Israel, America’s Kurdish allies, and a few sharp counterterrorism strikes?
First off, Biden’s claim that his administration shifted the balance of power in the Middle East rings hollow. For years, U.S. policy under Democratic leadership has been marred by a failure to confront Iranian aggression and an unwillingness to decisively deal with Syria’s Assad. Let’s not forget the infamous “red line” fiasco under Obama, when Assad’s use of chemical weapons on his own people was met with handwringing instead of action. Fast forward to today, and it’s the same song: weakness, indecision, and playing catch-up while allies like Israel and the Syrian Kurds do the heavy lifting.
And about those allies? Biden’s team has spent more time lecturing Israel than backing its efforts to neutralize Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Israel’s relentless response to the October 7 attacks, which devastated Gaza and rattled Iran’s proxy network, likely did more to weaken Assad’s position than anything coming out of D.C. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s acknowledgment of Donald Trump’s recognition of the Golan Heights underscores how pivotal prior U.S. policies were in tilting the region’s dynamics—policies Biden has often tried to undo.
Critics, including experts like John Hannah and Behnam Ben Taleblu, rightly question how an administration that’s been “risk-averse” in Syria suddenly deserves credit for Assad’s fall. It doesn’t. Biden’s reluctance to support Israel in finishing its fight against Iran’s proxies has been a glaring misstep. Meanwhile, the administration’s hesitance to tackle Tehran head-on has only emboldened the mullahs, Hezbollah, and other bad actors across the Middle East.
“President Biden’s efforts to take credit for the fatal weakening of Iran and Hezbollah is, frankly speaking, unseemly. The harsh reality is that if Israel had succumbed to the Biden administration’s pressures and followed its advice over the past 14 months of war, Iran and Hezbollah would have been far stronger and Israel far weaker than they are today,” Hannah said.
“Respectfully, it’s a bit odd to have an administration, which pulled punches against the Assad regime in Syria as well as its patron, the Islamic Republic of Iran, try to take credit for the fall of the Assad regime,” Behnam Ben Taleblu stated.
The Assad regime’s collapse might feel like a win, but it comes with a dark undercurrent: the resurgence of ISIS. While Biden touts a handful of strikes against the terror group, the risk of sleeper cells reactivating is real. And who’s left to deal with this mess? The Syrian Kurds, who’ve long borne the brunt of the fight against ISIS and now face existential threats from Turkey and pro-Turkey jihadi groups. America’s Kurdish allies deserve better than Biden’s halfhearted support and shifting priorities.
As Senator Lindsey Graham pointed out, a breakout of ISIS fighters would be catastrophic—not just for Syria but for U.S. interests globally. Yet Biden’s policies, from Afghanistan to Syria, have repeatedly weakened America’s deterrence, signaling to both allies and adversaries that this administration lacks the resolve to lead decisively.
Syria’s unraveling might look like a win on paper, but it’s a fragile one. The Biden administration’s narrative conveniently glosses over its own policy failures and the hard work of regional players who’ve carried the burden. If the White House wants to claim credit, it might first want to clean up its act in the Middle East.
